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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
•	The	new	European	Instrument	for	Democracy	
and	 Human	 Rights	 (EIDHR)	 will	 become	 an	
effective	tool	of	democracy	assistance	only	if	its	
reform	is	followed	by		substantive	changes	in	the	
civil	service	culture.	The	European	Commission	
should	 reform	 the	 staff	 rules,	 so	 that	 EU	 civil	
servants	 responsible	 for	 grants	 allocation	 are	
not	 forced	 to	 choose	 between	 the	 competing	
goals	 of	 budget	 transparency	 and	 flexibility,	
especially	 in	 support	 to	 human	 rights	 activists	
working	in	conditions	where	strict	confidentiality	
is	required.
•	Visegrad	and	other	like-minded	governments	
should	 work	 closely	 with	 the	 European	
Parliament,	 particularly	 with	 its	 democracy	
caucus,	 to	ensure	that	 the	Parliament	conducts	
a	mid-term	evaluation	of	 the	effectiveness	and	
utility	 of	 the	 new	 EIDHR,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 a	
qualitative	rather	than	purely	financial	evaluation,	
complementary	 to	 the	evaluation	scheduled	 to	
be	undertaken	by	the	European	Commission	in	
2009.	An	independent	evaluator	should	focus	
on	potential	loopholes	of	the	EIDHR,	especially	
in	those	countries	where	human	rights	are	most	
at	 risk	 and	where	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 utility	
of	the	EU	instrument	can	prove	problematic,	for	
instance	in	Cuba	or	Belarus.
•	The	 Czech	 and	 Swedish	 EU	 presidencies	
should	 set	 as	 a	 priority	 the	 completion	 of	
the	 above	 monitoring	 process,	 and	 also	
the	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	
the	 new	 Polish-Swedish	 initiative	 for	 a	 new	
“eastern	partnership”	calling	for,	inter	alia,	 the	
establishment	of	visa-free	relations	with	western	
Balkans	countries	and	eastern	ENP	neighbours,	
and	 strengthening	 the	 democracy	 assistance	
focus	on	Ukraine,	Moldova,	Georgia,	Armenia	
and	Azerbaijan.
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•	Visegrad	 governments	 should	 support	
flexible	 funding	 initiatives,	 including	 the	
European	 Foundation	 for	 Democracy	 through	
Partnership	 (EFDP),	 and	 opt	 for	 more	 flexible,	
less	bureaucratic	and	more	hands-on	European-
level	approaches	to	democracy	assistance;	the	
Visegrad	 governments	 should	 then	 engage	 in	
coalition-building	 among	 EU	 member	 states,	
EU	 institutions,	 and	 other	 key	 stakeholders	
(including	 political	 foundations)	 to	 ensure	 EU	
funding	 reaches	 civil	 society	 groups	 working	
for	 democracy	 and	 human	 rights	 in	 high-risk	
situations,	where	flexibility,	quick	decisions	and	
confidentiality	are	required.
•	The	implementation	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty	presents	
the	French-Czech-Swedish	EU	presidency	with	
an	opportunity	 to	make	democracy	promotion	
a	 pillar	 of	 a	 common	 EU	 foreign	 policy,	 and	
for	 this	 to	 be	 reflected	 in	 the	 priorities	 of	 the	
new	 EU	High	 Representative	 for	 Foreign	 and	
Security	Policy	and	the	new	EU	External	Action	
Service.	
•	The	 idea	 that	 the	 EU	 should	 provide	
development	 assistance	 only	 to	 governments	
that	demonstrate	political	will	and	a	measurable	
commitment	 in	 the	 field	 of	 democracy	 and	
human	rights	should	be	adopted	and	consistently	
implemented	 within	 the	 new	 external	 action	
agenda.	The	‘poverty	reduction	first’	approach	
is	based	on	a	fallacious	concept	that	significant	
and	 sustainable	 progress	 in	 poverty	 reduction	
can	be	achieved	without	improvements	in	good	
governance	and	accountability.
•	Non-governmental	 organisations	 from	 the	
EU’s	 new	 member	 states	 should	 be	 given	
greater	 visibility	 in	 Brussels,	 and	 groups	 with	
recent	transition	experience,	but	limited	financial	
capacity,	 should	 be	 encouraged	 to	 apply	 for	
EU	 funding	 under	 the	 European	 Instrument	 for	
Democracy	and	Human	Rights.	V4	governments	
should	assist	 their	NGOs	 to	participate	 in	EU	
democracy	 projects	 through	 the	 provision	 of	
matching	 funds	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 their	
own	democracy	assistance	programmes.
Development policy and 
select “strategic” relations 
versus democracy and 
human rights
The	enlargement	of	the	European	Union	to	27	
members	 is	a	clear	 indication	of	 the	progress	
in	consolidation	of	democracy	in	the	continent,	
but	the	eastward	extension	of	the	EU	has	also	
brought	to	its	borders	Belarus,	a	dictatorship,	as	
well	as	Ukraine,	a	strategically	placed	country	
increasingly	 squeezed	 between	 Russia	 and	
the	 west,	 as	 was	 so	 evident	 when	 many	 EU	
members	 held	 back	 from	 offering	 Ukraine	 a	
NATO	membership	action	plan	at	the	Bucharest	
summit	on	4	April	2008.	
Through	PHARE	and	the	adoption	of	the	acquis	
communautaire	in	the	1990s,	the	EU	played	a	
decisive	role	in	the	return	to	Europe	of	the	eight	
new	 members	 who	 joined	 the	 EU	 in	 2004.	
But	the	EU	waited	until	 the	fall	of	authoritarian	
regimes	before	offering	 this	generous	support,	
both	 financially	 and	 vocally.	 Is	 the	 EU	 doing	
enough	 now	 for	 those	 where	 the	 transition	
process	 has	 slowed,	 or	 faltered,	 or	 where	
authoritarian	rule	has	remained	or	become	even	
more	entrenched?
In	 the	 1980s	 the	 EU	 governments	 –	 both	
individually	 and	 collectively	 -	 lagged	 behind	
US	 support	 in	 terms	 of	 democratic	 assistance	
to	non-governmental	organisations	 in	countries	
where	 democracy	was	 either	 absent	 or	 in	 its	
early	stages	of	development.	Unfortunately,	this	
democracy	assistance	gap	on	 the	part	 of	 the	
EU	 persists	 today.	 On	 the	 EU’s	 doorstep,	 for	
instance	in	Georgia	and	Ukraine,	US	support	to	
civil	society	continues	to	outstrip	the	EU’s	support	
–	not	only	 in	 terms	of	political	 support,	but	 in	
terms	of	financial	support	 to	non-governmental	
organisations.
While	 European	 Commission	 support	 to	
Ukraine,	 under	 the	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	
Governance	 Facility,	 has	 been	 increased	 to	
€	 22	 million	 for	 2007-10,	 in	 recognition	 of	
its	 democratic	 reforms,	 similar	 increases	 have	
gone	 to	countries	 such	as	Morocco	under	 the	
same	 Governance	 Facility	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
any	democratic	reforms	-	essentially	due	to	“an	
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old-style	 east-south	 division	 of	 resources,	 not	
based	on	objective	and	consistent	democratic	
criteria	across	different	partner	countries”1.
The	EU	generally	provides	more	donor	aid	 to	
its	 eastern	 neighbours	 than	 does	 the	 US,	 but	
the	funds	go	to	governments;	when	it	comes	to	
democracy	assistance	to	civil	society	groups,	the	
US	is	consistently	the	lead	agent.	For	instance,	
from	1998-2004,	total	EU	assistance	to	Ukraine	
amounted	 to	 €	 826m	 and	 US	 assistance	
€	1.2bn.	Of	those	sums,	€	134m	of	EU	support	
went	to	democracy	assistance;	€	370m	of	US	
support	went	 to	 democracy	 assistance.	 In	 the	
same	period,	EU	support	to	Belarus	was	more	
than	double	the	level	of	US	support;	but	90%	of	
US	support	went	to	democracy	assistance;	the	
only	data	available	on	the	EU	side	indicates	that	
only	7%	of	EU	support	was	definitely	allocated	
to	democracy	assistance.		
Fragile	 democracies	 need	 support.	 At	 a	
time	 when,	 in	 Russia	 and	 throughout	 Central	
Asia,	 civil	 society	 is	 threatened	 by	 restrictive	
legislation,	and	 international	 support,	 from	 for	
instance	George	Soros’s	Open	Society	Institute,	
meets	 hostility	 from	 the	 authorities,	 the	 EU	 is	
well	placed	to	work	-	very	often	through	its	new	
members	 that	 have	 emerged	 from	 the	 former	
communist	bloc	-	to	promote	human	rights	and	
freedom	 of	 association	 in	 regimes	 where	 an	
opening	can	be	detected.
Kazakhstan’s	 President	 Nursultan	 Nazarbaev	
justified	the	introduction	of	severe	restrictions	on	
civil	 society	 in	 2005	 following	 the	 Rose	 and	
Orange	 revolutions	 in	 Georgia	 and	 Ukraine	
respectively	as	a	response	to	“the	dangers	that	
arose	 in	 neighbouring	 countries	when	 foreign	
NGOs	 insolently	 pumped	 in	 money	 and	
destabilised	society.	The	state	was	defenceless	
against	this.”	Neither	the	European	Commission	
nor	EU	countries,	with	the	exception	of	Germany,	
increased	support	to	Kyrgyzstan	after	the	2005	
Tulip	Revolution,	the	democratising	potential	of	
which	has	since	largely	faltered.
1 Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane?	
By	Richard	Youngs,	Centre	for	European	Studies	Working	
Document	No.	292/May	2008
Enlargement is no longer 
a powerful incentive for 
democratic reforms
The	 EU’s	 principal	 democracy	 assistance	
strategy	has	been	the	enlargement	process,	but	
besides	Croatia,	 and	perhaps	Macedonia	 or	
Montenegro,	further	enlargement	is	unlikely	until	
the	 second	half	 of	 the	 next	 decade,	 not	 least	
while	the	EU	seeks	to	ratify	and	then	implement	
the	 Lisbon	 Treaty.	 Without	 the	 incentive	 of	
enlargement,	 the	 EU	 needs	 to	 combine	 a	
values-based	 approach	 with	 other	 realistic	
incentives	 to	 stimulate	 good	 governance	 and	
democratisation.	In	the	case	of	Turkey,	increased	
democracy	 and	 respect	 for	 human	 rights	 has	
been	 met	 by	 attempts	 by	 EU	 governments,	
notably	 France,	 Germany	 and	 Austria,	 to	
remove	 any	 prospect	 of	 EU	 membership	 for	
Turkey	-	instead	of	engagement	with	a	strategic	
ally	that	has	embraced	democracy.
An	 important	 test	 facing	 the	 EU	 now	 will	 be	
the	credibility	and	effectiveness	of	the	reformed	
European	 Instrument	 (formerly	 Initiative)	 for	
Democracy	 and	 Human	 Rights	 (EIDHR).	 The	
earlier	 initiative,	designed	 to	be	more	 flexible	
than	other	EU	funding,	for	instance	not	requiring	
the	approval	of	projects	by	host	governments,	
fell	 short	 because	 European	 Commission	
delegates,	in	Belarus	for	instance,	continued	to	
work	almost	exclusively	with	projects	approved	
by	the	Lukashenko	regime.	
Important	 reforms	 have	 been	 introduced,	
enabling	EIDHR	 funding	 to	go	 to	unregistered	
groups,	 and	 allowing	 some,	 but	 limited	 re-
granting,	 but	 research	 indicates	 that	 the	
reforms	 in	 the	 financial	 regulations	 were	 not	
accompanied	 by	 changes	 in	 staff	 rules	 that	
govern	 the	 decision-making	 of	 European	
Commission	officials,	for	whom	the	competing	
goals	 of	 transparency	 and	 flexibility	 have	 not	
been	resolved.
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More flexible funding for 
hands-on democracy and 
human rights activism
On	18	January	2006,	the	European	Parliament’s	
Resolution	on	the	EU’s	Neighbourhood	included	
a	 statement	 that	 it	 “considers	 it	 useful	 to	
establish	a	 special	 European	 fund	 to	 support,	
in	 an	 efficient	 and	 flexible	 manner,	 initiatives	
promoting	 parliamentary	 democracy	 in	
neighbouring	countries”.	
David	 French	 of	 the	 Westminster	 Foundation	
for	Democracy	and	Roel	von	Meijenfeldt	of	the	
Netherlands	 Institute	 for	Multiparty	Democracy	
argued	that	a	new	foundation	“would	establish	
an	 operational	 facility	 at	 arm’s	 length	 from	
the	 institutions	 of	 the	 EU,	 capable	 of	 timely	
responses	 to	 demands	where	 and	when	 they	
are	 most	 needed”,	 and	 “should	 provide	 a	
flexible	funding	instrument	to	support	democratic	
reform	 processes	 and	 programmes,	 capable	
of	operating	at	a	greater	 level	of	 suppleness,	
responsiveness	and	risk”2.		
The	 European	 Foundation	 for	 Democracy	
through	 Partnership	 was	 launched	 in	 Brussels	
on	15	April	2008	with	 the	 support	of	 former	
Czech	 President	 Václav	 Havel	 and	 European	
Commission	President	José	Manuel	Barroso.	The	
new	foundation	 includes	Board	members	 from	
Finland,	 the	 Netherlands,	 France,	 Germany,	
Poland,	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 Slovakia,	 and	
Portugal,	 combining	 old	 and	 new,	 and	 large	
and	small,	eastern	and	southern	EU	members.	
At	the	launch,	Barroso	said	he	was	“delighted	
that	 [the	 new	 foundation]	 will	 be	 reinforcing	
Europe’s	 visibility	 still	 more	 in	 our	 converging	
activities	to	promote	democracy.”
However,	 the	 European	 Commission	 is	 not	
committing	 funding	 to	 the	 new	 foundation,	
and	 the	 continued	 excuse	 for	 the	 EU	 placing	
democracy	 a	 low	 second-place	 behind	
development	 and	 select	 geo-political	 priorities	
was	evident	in	the	same	speech,	when	Barroso	
continued:	“However,	[political	pluralism,	social	
justice	and	 respect	 for	 human	dignity]	will	 be	
2	 A European Foundation for Democracy through 
Partnership,	Netherlands	Institute	for	Multiparty	Democracy,	
March	2006
achieved	 only	 if	we	 first	 succeed	 in	 reducing	
poverty	 and	 injustice.”	 Few	 would	 deny	 the	
importance	 of	 tackling	 poverty	 and	 injustice,	
but	 the	 current	 example	 of	 Zimbabwe	 is	 a	
reminder	 that	 the	abandonment	of	democracy	
and	human	rights	can	lead	to	dire	poverty,	and	
that	a	belief	in	the	sequence	of	tackling	poverty	
first,	 then	 introducing	 political	 pluralism,	 is	 at	
best	applicable	very	selectively,	at	worst	deeply	
flawed.	Development	and	democracy	go	hand	
in	hand,	not	one	before	the	other,	as	dictators	
keen	to	postpone	pluralism	would	like	to	have	
prospective	donors	believe.
			
The key tests facing the 
new European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human 
Rights
Unlike	in	the	US,	“democracy	assistance”	does	
not	 feature	 in	 EU	 discourse,	 and	 no	 concept	
for	a	democratisation	strategy	is	on	the	agenda	
of	 the	 European	 Commission.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	 the	 “promotion	 of	 human	 rights	 and	
democracy”	 has	 become	 a	 well-established	
component	of	EU	external	relations	policy,	with	
multiple	 references	 to	 it	 at	 various	 institutional	
levels	and	 in	financial	 instruments.	So	 it	came	
as	no	surprise	 that	 the	European	Commission,	
when	presenting	in	2004	the	draft	reform	of	the	
EU	external	assistance	instruments	linked	to	the	
Financial	Perspective	2007–2013,	envisaged	
(only)	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 thematic	 programme	
focusing	 on	 democracy	 and	 human	 rights,	 a	
separate	 facility	without	a	 specific	 legal	basis	
that	would	 replace	 the	 European	 Initiative	 for	
Democracy	and	Human	Rights.	
Besides	 this	 thematic	 programme,	 all	
geographical	 instruments	 were	 expected	 to	
be	 “comprehensive	 in	 order	 to	 incorporate	
all	 relevant	 policy	 objectives	 and	 ensure	
mainstreaming	 of	 cross-cutting	 issues,	 such	 as	
democracy	and	human	rights…”	
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Putting civil society 
centre-stage
The	 suggested	 democracy	 and	 human	 rights	
thematic	programme	was	intended	to	cover	those	
countries	where	human	rights	and	fundamental	
freedoms	were	particularly	at	 risk;	 in	contrast,	
where	 co-operation	between	civil	 society	and	
government	 could	 be	 established,	 support	
for	 civil	 society	 and	 non–state	 actors	 would	
have	 fallen	 under	 the	 label	 of	 development	
co-operation	 and	 support	 to	 networking	 and	
civil	society	dialogue	at	national	and	regional	
level.	
The	clash	over	keeping	a	separate	democracy	
and	 human	 rights	 instrument	 proved	 to	 be	 a	
challenge.	In	this	debate,	a	crucial	factor	was	the	
strong	partnership	between	civil	society	actors	
and	 the	 democracy	 caucus	 in	 the	 European	
Parliament.	With	the	involvement	of	several	EU	
member	states,	the	idea	reached	a	critical	mass	
of	 support,	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 new	
European	Instrument	for	Democracy	and	Human	
Rights	was	agreed	in	June	2006.	The	question	
as	to	how	effective	the	new	Instrument	is	going	
to	be	in	reality	remains	to	be	answered	in	the	
years	 to	come	when	 the	first	cycle	of	projects	
has	been	implemented.	
One	 of	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 EU	
external	assistance	financial	instruments	was	to	
introduce	more	flexibility.	However,	it	has	to	be	
understood	 that	 any	 change	 takes	 place	 in	 a	
given	 framework.	EU	assistance	will	probably	
always	display	a	certain	degree	of	 rigidity	 in	
terms	 of	 programming	 cycles	 or	 budgeting,	
stemming	from	the	general	rules	to	be	followed	
when	dealing	with	EU	funds.	
In	line	with	the	reform,	the	Financial	Regulation	
and	 Implementing	 Rules	 were	 amended	 with	
effect	 from	1	May	2007.	 The	main	 changes	
introduced	by	the	reforms	are:	
•	the	 possibility	 to	 fund	 non-registered	
organisations	
•	the	possibility	of	re-granting
•	the	financial	liability	of	the	authorising	officials	
was	clarified,
•	a	reinforced	trend	towards	transparency	(full	
reporting	and	public	disclosure	of	 the	projects	
and	 fund	 recipients)	 was	 combined	 with	 an	
emphasis	on	the	safety	of	the	beneficiaries.	
Rules first, quality second
Although	several	steps	forward	were	taken	and	
some	obstacles	to	flexible	project	management	
were	 removed,	 at	 least	 two	 reservations	 can	
be	 voiced.	 First,	 the	 Financial	 Regulation	and	
Implementing	Rules	are	general	documents;	the	
implementation	of	a	particular	provision	 is	not	
fully	defined	and	leaves	a	significant	portion	of	
discretion	(and	risk	assessment)	to	the	authorising	
officials.	This	trend	itself	could	be	very	positive	if	
the	European	Commission’s	management	culture	
was	not	still	guided	by	the	informal	principle	of	
“rules	first,	quality	second”.	
Only	the	actual	implementation	of	the	EIDHR	will	
tell	whether	a	sea-change	in	the	Commission’s	
culture	 is	 underway,	 and	 only	 effective	
monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 of	 the	 instrument	
will	 provide	 evidence	 for	 the	 need	 for	 further	
institutional	reform.	
Furthermore,	 the	 provisions	 on	 the	 financial	
liability	 of	 officials	 only	 compound	 this	
problem.	Although	the	Financial	Regulation	and	
Implementing	Rules	specifically	allow	for	more	
flexibility	 on	 the	 side	 of	 officials,	 the	 problem	
was	and	remains	the	Commission’s	management	
culture,	 where	 too	 much	 pressure	 and	 the	
burden	of	responsibility	are	placed	on	the	desk	
officers.	 Second,	 in	 some	 cases	 (re-granting,	
financial	 guarantees),	 the	 results	 achieved	 by	
pressure	from	civil	society	organisations	during	
the	negotiations	on	the	amendments	are	rather	
modest	 (for	 example,	 from	 any	 one	 grant	 the	
maximum	 that	 can	 be	 re-granted	 to	 a	 single	
organisation	is	€	10,000,	and	the	maximum	in	
total	that	can	be	re-granted	is	€	100,000).	
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Reaching organisations 
without the host 
government’s stamp 
of approval
The	potential	 strength	of	 the	pre-reform	EIDHR	
was	the	possibility	to	operate	without	the	need	
of	a	host	government’s	consent;	 it	 represented	
a	programme	with	not	only	development	goals	
but	 with	 policy	 and	 political	 reach.	 These	
features	 were	 retained	 and	 enhanced	 within	
the	 new	 Instrument.	 However,	 the	 pre-reform	
EIDHR	was	also	a	target	of	extensive	criticism.	It	
is	generally	agreed	that	the	main	problem	was	
the	incapacity	of	the	European	Commission	to	
manage,	 fund	 and	 co-ordinate	 projects	 in	 a	
fast,	flexible	and	responsive	way	–	in	particular,	
the	 centralised	 calls	 for	 proposals	 with	 long	
periods	 of	 project	 evaluation	 were	 subject	 to	
fierce	criticism.	For	these	reasons,	on	top	of	the	
failure	to	make	sufficient	use	of	the	possibility	to	
bypass	the	host	government,	it	failed	to	have	real	
impact,	 supporting	 largely	 ad-hoc	 initiatives,	
not	applying	 resources	strategically,	and	often	
losing	momentum	 for	 supporting	 locally	driven	
processes	of	change.	
The	new	Instrument	naturally	aims	at	overcoming	
some	 of	 the	 criticism.	Generally,	 it	 puts	 more	
emphasis	on	civil	society	as	a	vehicle	for	change.	
Although	civil	society	was	considered	the	most	
important	element	of	the	democratisation	efforts	
under	the	initial	EIDHR,	civil	society	is	now	seen	
not	only	as	the	ultimate	beneficiary	of	the	new	
Instrument,	but	as	an	active	player	in	the	process	
of	democratisation	and	human	rights	promotion	
in	third	countries.	
Targeting more countries, 
but resources spread 
more thinly
The	 number	 of	 countries	 eligible	 for	 EIDHR	
funding	 is	 constantly	growing	and,	according	
to	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	 thematic	
approach	has	become	a	necessity	for	effective	
implementation	 and	 for	 delivery	 of	 results.	 A	
trend	 towards	 further	 integration	 of	 themes	
into	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 campaigns	 in	 order	
to	 streamline	 and	 reduce	 fragmentation	 is	
evident.	
Some	provisions	aiming	at	making	 the	 system	
faster	 and	 more	 flexible	 were	 also	 adopted;	
for	 example,	 the	 Commission	 now	 has	 the	
possibility	 to	 adopt	 Special	 and	 Ad	 hoc	
measures	in	case	of	urgent	need	(without	calls	
for	 proposals,	 targeting	 specifically	 human	
rights	defenders).	 In	 total,	4.3%	of	 the	budget	
of	the	EIDHR	is	reserved	for	such	measures.	The	
EIDHR	regulation	also	makes	eligible	for	funding	
“entities	that	do	not	have	legal	personality	under	
the	 applicable	 national	 law”	 and	 “groups	 of	
natural	persons	without	a	legal	personality	and	
civil	society	organisations”.	
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A Democracy Foundation 
at arm's length
As	 part	 of	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 flexibility	 of	 the	
new	 Instrument,	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 transfer	 of	
powers	and	 resources	emerged	 in	connection	
with	 the	proposal	 to	establish	an	 independent	
foundation	 managing	 at	 least	 a	 part	 of	 the	
EIDHR	 budget.	 The	 idea	 of	 the	 European	
Foundation	for	Democracy	 through	Partnership	
(EFDP)	 was	 tabled,	 with	 support	 from	 the	
European	 Parliament	 democracy	 caucus,	 but	
it	was	ultimately	decided	that	no	direct	EIDHR	
funding	would	be	allocated	to	the	foundation.	
Other	 questions	 or	 key	 criticisms	 remain	 to	
be	 resolved:	 for	 example,	 how	 can	 the	 intra-	
and	 inter-EU	 institutional	 co-operation	 be	
strengthened,	how	can	co-operation	with	other	
donors	be	made	more	effective?	
The	 long	 evaluation	 process	 pertaining	 to	
projects	 tabled	 within	 the	 centralised	 funding	
schemes	(macro-projects)	will	most	probably	stay	
in	 place,	which	means	 a	 continuing	 obstacle	
to	operational	flexibility	and	quick	response	to	
developing	situations.	
Electoral	Observation	Missions	continued	to	be	
funded	from	EIDHR,	even	though	the	EU	sends	
missions	 only	 to	 the	 countries	 that	 invite	 them	
to	do	so,	clearly	contradicting	 the	 idea	of	 the	
instrument	 that	actions	covered	do	not	 require	
the	host	government's	consent.
To	 conclude,	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 reform	 was	 to	
tackle	 some	 of	 the	 problems	 and	 points	 of	
criticism	connected	to	EU	democracy	assistance	
implemented	 through	 civil	 society.	 The	 real	
impact	 of	 the	 improved	 legal	 basis	 can	 be	
tested	only	when	the	new	instrument	has	been	
through	the	first	cycle	of	implementation	-	and	it	
is	truly	the	implementation	phase	where	most	of	
the	potential	pitfalls	are.	EIDHR	is	an	instrument-
in-making,	 and	 scrutiny	 and	 monitoring	 in	
the	 coming	 years	 is	 essential	 to	 ensure	 that	
the	 Instrument’s	 mid-term	 evaluation,	 which	 is	
envisaged	 for	2009,	 is	conducted	not	 just	by	
the	rules,	but	also	according	to	the	quality	of	the	
grants	process	and	the	resulting	programmes.	
The	level	of	funding,	and	the	country	coverage,	
and	in	particular	the	level	of	flexibility	exercised,	
and	the	extent	to	which	programmes	are	funded	
without	 host	 government	 consent,	 will	 be	 an	
important	pointer	to	judge	the	trajectory	of	EU	
democracy	assistance	policies.	
External Action Service 
must have ears and eyes 
in-country
In	an	effort	to	boost	flexibility,	the	Commission	
intends	 instead	 to	 continue	 to	 transfer	
competences	 to	 the	 European	 Commission	
Delegations	in	third	countries.	However,	further	
delegation	of	the	management	of	EIDHR	funding	
to	 EC	 Delegations	 without	 reinforcing	 their	
capacities	could	be	counterproductive,	bringing	
additional	 administrative	 burdens	 to	 the	 staff	
and,	in	fact,	diminishing	their	effectiveness.	
Once	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 is	 ratified,	 the	 EU	
Special	Representative	for	Foreign	and	Security	
Policy	will	be	asked	 to	 formulate	 the	basis	on	
which	the	new	EU	External	Action	Service	will	
be	established	and	will	operate.	It	is	clear	that	
the	 transformation	 of	 European	 Commission	
delegations	will	 require	not	only	experienced,	
trained	diplomats,	but	also	policymakers	to	be	
represented	at	the	country	level,	not	for	instance	
through	regional	missions	covering	a	number	of	
countries	-	a	recipe	for	decisions	to	end	up	being	
made	with	 third-country	diplomats	stationed	 in	
Brussels	and	for	Commission	delegations	to	be	
"uninstructed"	.	The	EU	Special	Representative	for	
Foreign	and	Security	Policy	should	be	mandated	
to	make	democracy	and	human	rights	a	pillar	
of	 the	 EU's	 foreign	 and	 security	 policy,	 and	
should	ensure	that	the	External	Action	Service	is	
equipped	to	implement	that	mandate.	
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